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Many	 vulnerable	 groups	 fall	 through	 the	 cracks	 of	 the	 United	
States’	asylum	system,	unable	to	find	relief	within	the	labyrinthine	yet	
insufficient	protections	 it	offers.1	One	particular	 category	of	 endan-
gered	individuals	consists	of	women	and	girls	who	are	being	perse-
cuted	based	on	their	gender.2	Gender-based	persecution	includes	do-
mestic	 violence,	 rape	 by	 criminal	 gangs,	 and	 honor	 killings,	 among	









ing	process.	Special	 thanks	to	Chizuko,	Akira,	and	Ananda	Shastri	 for	 their	 love	and	





SAN	 DIEGO	 UNION-TRIB.	 (Dec.	 15,	 2019),	 https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/	
news/border-baja-california/story/2019-12-15/remain-in-mexico-has-a-0-01	
-percent-asylum-grant-rate	[https://perma.cc/22FT-YEZB].	
































agency	 interpretations	 of	 statutes	 within	 their	 regulatory	 purview	





































































































































vention,	 circuit	 courts	 that	previously	deferred	 to	 the	BIA’s	current	
PSG	standard	now	have	cause	to	revisit	those	prior	rulings	and	should	












ship	 in	 a	 PSG	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 asylum	 applications.27	 This	 Part	 then	
explores	Chevron	deference,	an	administrative	law	doctrine	that	has	
been	extremely	 influential	 in	 shaping	 immigration	 law	and	 the	PSG	
standard,	paying	particular	attention	to	concerns	about	the	doctrine	
expressed	by	Supreme	Court	Justices.28	Finally,	this	Part	concludes	by	













































As	 a	 result	 of	 events	 occurring	 before	 1	 January	 1951	 and	 owing	 to	well-




























qualifying	 individuals	may	 be	 denied	 asylum	 based	 on	 the	 govern-
ment’s	broad	discretion.42	The	overarching	structure	of	U.S.	asylum	
law,	therefore,	serves	to	work	as	a	set	of	legal	“filters”	that	limit	access	
to	 relief.43	 All	 five	 of	 the	 grounds	 for	 asylum	protection—including	
membership	 in	a	PSG—can	potentially	 include	 large	numbers	of	di-





gration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	 Responsibility	 Act	 of	 1996,	 Pub.	 L.	 No.	 104-208,	

































tive	 branch.46	 Immigration	 judges,	while	 located	within	 the	 federal	




















	 47.	 Stephen	H.	Legomsky,	Restructuring	 Immigration	Adjudication,	 59	DUKE	L.J.	
1635,	1640	(2010).	
	 48.	 8	C.F.R.	§	1003.0	(2018).	









L.	REV.	 707,	709	 (2019)	 (citing	Strengthening	and	Reforming	America’s	 Immigration	
Court	System:	Hearing	Before	the	Subcomm.	on	Border	Sec.	&	Immigr.	of	the	S.	Comm.	on	




















tion	 to	 an	 IJ	 for	 further	 defensive	 consideration	 in	 the	 context	 of	
removal	proceedings.59	Sixty-five	percent	of	affirmative	applications	




individual	cases	before	 them.	8	C.F.R.	§	1003.1(d)(1)(ii)	 (2018).	Yet,	 they	must	also	
“act	 as	 the	 Attorney	 General’s	 delegates	 in	 the	 cases	 that	 come	 before	 them.”	 Id.	
§	1003.1(a)	(2018);	see	also	Michael	Kagan,	Chevron’s	Liberty	Exception,	104	IOWA	L.	
REV.	491,	493	(2019)	(“In	a	deportation	case,	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	





























In	addition	 to	 the	broader	uncertainty	asylum	seekers	 face	be-
cause	of	the	infirmities	and	inefficiencies	of	the	structure	of	asylum	
















ing	 in	 immigration	 courts	 nationwide.	 Immigration	 Court	 Backlog	Tool,	 SYRACUSE	U.	





	 65.	 Acosta,	 19	 I.	 &	 N.	 Dec.	 211	 (B.I.A.	 1985),	 overruled	 on	 other	 grounds	 by	
Mogharrabi,	19	I.	&	N.	Dec.	439,	441	(B.I.A.	1987)	(“[T]he	‘clear	probability’	standard	
and	the	 ‘well-founded	fear’	standard	are	not	meaningfully	different	and,	 in	practical	
























































Zealand	 following	 the	 standard	 set	 in	 the	 United	 States.76	 In	 2002,	
summarizing	 the	practices	of	 these	 and	other	 countries,	 the	United	
Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	(UNHCR)	issued	Guidelines	

























































statute	 by	 regulation.	 Such	 legislative	 regulations	 are	 given	 controlling	












In	 King	 v.	 Burwell,	 the	 Court	 applied	 an	 additional	 “extraordinary	
questions”	or	“major	questions”	limitation	to	the	scope	of	Chevron	def-
























preme	Court—prevented	 .	.	.	 ambiguities	 from	being	vented	and	re-




espousing	 the	 possibility	 that	 an	 agency	may	waive	Chevron	 defer-
ence.97	With	all	of	the	exceptions	that	have	been	built	in,	the	Chevron	






























































































































ers,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Feb.	 6,	 2017),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/	
dealbook/gorsuch-nomination-puts-spotlight-on-agency-powers.html	[https://	
perma.cc/KCZ7-UM4A];	Steven	Davidoff	Solomon,	Should	Agencies	Decide	Law?	Doc-









Though	 they	have	not	been	as	explicitly	 critical	of	 the	Chevron	
doctrine,	Chief	 Justice	Roberts	and	 Justice	Alito	also	appear	 to	have	
doctrinal	 concerns	with	 judicial	 deference	 to	 agencies.	 Christopher	








questions	outside	of	 immigration	 law	indicate	that	 the	time	may	be	
approaching	for	a	reckoning	about	the	continued	applicability	of	the	
doctrine	overall.	At	the	very	least,	a	reckoning	in	the	immigration	con-
text	 seems	 likely	 and	 appropriate	 considering	 two	 recent	 develop-
ments.	Pereira	v.	Sessions	was	a	2018	Supreme	Court	case	that	cen-
tered	around	the	BIA’s	interpretation	of	Section	1229(a)	of	the	1996	
Illegal	 Immigration	 Reform	 and	 Immigrant	 Responsibility	 Act	






























be	discerned	 .	.	.	and	whether	 the	BIA’s	 interpretation	was	reasona-
ble.”128	 He	 called	 this	 “reflexive	 deference”129	 and	 citing	 concerns	
raised	by	Justice	Thomas	and	Justice	Gorsuch	noted	that	“it	seems	nec-
essary	 and	 appropriate	 to	 reconsider,	 in	 an	 appropriate	 case,	 the	





ence,	 is	 an	 offshoot	 of	 Chevron	 under	 which	 a	 court	 defers	 to	 an	
agency’s	interpretation	of	a	regulation	it	itself	has	promulgated.132	In	
2015,	Justices	Scalia,	Alito,	and	Thomas	showed	a	desire	to	reconsider	
Auer	deference,133	 and	 in	 2019	 the	Court	 finally	 took	up	 this	 ques-
tion.134	While	the	Court	ultimately	upheld	Auer,135	it	cabined	the	doc-































analysis	 and	 cross-reference	 to	 Justice	 Kennedy’s	 Pereira	 concur-
rence137	 is	 instructive	 and	may	well	 foreshadow	 how	 the	 Supreme	









he	 had	 requested.140	 The	Board	 of	 Veterans’	 Appeals,	 the	 appellate	
body	above	the	VA,	affirmed	the	retroactive	decision	based	on	its	in-





































biguous,	a	court	must	exhaust	all	 the	 ‘traditional	 tools’	of	 construc-
tions,”	citing	to	Chevron	as	“adopting	the	same	approach	for	ambigu-
ous	 statutes.”149	 It	 emphasized	 that	 “only	when	 that	 legal	 toolkit	 is	
empty	and	the	interpretive	question	still	has	no	single	right	answer	
can	a	judge	conclude	that	it	is	 ‘more	[one]	of	policy	than	of	law.’”150	







under	Chevron,	 the	agency’s	reading	must	 fall	 ‘within	the	bounds	of	















































Leaders	 “Better	Watch	Themselves,”	WASH.	POST	 (July	 13,	 2018,	 11:22	AM),	 https://	
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-immigration-is-changing-the-culture-of	
-europe-and-its-leaders-better-watch-themselves/2018/07/13/afb5d9a6-868b	

























































cases	 are	 pending	 through	 MPP;	 thousands	 of	 individuals	 are	 currently	 living	 in	
“cramped	and	unsanitary	conditions”	while	they	await	an	opportunity	to	seek	refuge	
in	 the	United	States.	 Jasmine	Aguilera,	Many	Asylum	Seekers	 in	Mexico	Can’t	Get	U.S.	
Court	Hearings	Until	2021.	A	Coronavirus	Outbreak	Could	‘Devastate’	Them,	TIME	(May	
19,	 2020),	 https://time.com/5830807/asylum-seekers-coronavirus-mpp	 [https://	
perma.cc/BT8J-7TCN];	 see	 Coronavirus	 Case	 in	 Refugee	 Camp	 on	 US-Mexico	 Border	










































us/politics/asylum-officers-trump.html	 [https://perma.cc/E87V-BG5F]	 (quoting	 a	
spokesman	 representing	 employees	 of	 USCIS);	 Priscilla	 Alvarez	 &	 Geneva	 Sands,	
Trump	Administration	Proposes	Sweeping	Changes	 to	US	Asylum	System	in	New	Rule,	
CNN	 (June	 10,	 2020),	 https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/10/politics/us-asylum-draft	























ity	 and	 social	 visibility	 in	 a	 series	 of	 decisions	 between	 2006	 and	














fully	 “exhaust[ing]	 all	 the	 ‘traditional	 tools’	 of	 [statutory]	
 
	 172.	 See,	e.g.,	Tess	Feldman,	Administration’s	Asylum	Proposal	Takes	Aim	at	LGBTQ	















































































ety.”195	 The	 Board	 concluded	 that	 there	 was	 insufficient	 evidence	








































































appeal	 of	Matter	 of	 C-A-	 and	provided	 a	 fairly	 cursory	 reference	 to	
Chevron,	framing	the	BIA’s	action	as	simply	a	“further	articulation	of	
the	Acosta	formulation”	 without	 explaining	 precisely	 why	 this	 was	
so.209	Similarly,	in	its	review	of	the	direct	appeal	of	Matter	of	A-M-E-	&	
J-G-U-,210	the	Second	Circuit	deferred	to	social	visibility	and	particu-



















In	Orellana-Monson	 v.	Holder,	 the	Fifth	Circuit	 also	determined	
that	the	BIA’s	incorporation	of	particularity	and	social	visibility	was	a	
























































































































tions	 created	 by	 U.S.	 international	 treaty	 obligations.”236	 The	 fre-












characteristic”	 to	 be	 problematic.240	 The	 court	 determined	 that	 ac-






























The	Third	Circuit	 also	 concluded	 that	 the	BIA’s	 addition	of	 the	




social	 visibility	 in	Matter	 of	 C-A-	 limiting	 PSGs	 to	 those	 defined	 by	
“characteristics	that	were	highly	visible	and	recognizable	by	others	in	










garding	 its	 addition	 of	 social	 visibility	 and	 particularity	 as	 require-
ments,	 the	Seventh	Circuit	 issued	a	decision	with	its	most	thorough	
opinion	analyzing	the	PSG	standard.249	In	Cece	v.	Holder,	the	court	en	




































































were	 to	exclude	particular	groups	because	of	 their	 size,	 it	 is	 incon-
sistent	with	 international	 refugee	agreements.261	On	 the	other	 side,	
the	government	argued	for	a	new	test	of	“social	distinction”	saying	it	
was	a	necessary	clarification	to	Acosta.262	Specifically,	it	argued	that	to	





















































three	main	 concerns.274	 First,	 the	 new	 test	 is	 inconsistent	with	 the	
statute	and	disparately	restricts	access	to	refugee	protections	for	ap-
plicants	 with	 PSG	 claims	 compared	 to	 those	 with	 claims	 based	 on	















































General284	provides	an	example	of	 the	 sort	of	analysis	 circuits	have	
used	 to	 justify	deference	 to	 the	BIA	post-M-E-V-G-	and	W-G-R-.	 The	
opinion	began	by	noting	that	while	the	Eleventh	Circuit’s	standard	is	
to	apply	de	novo	review	to	BIA	decisions,	precedential	decisions	by	
the	Board	 are	 entitled	 to	Chevron	 deference.285	 It	 observed	 that	 its	
own	precedent	held	that	the	term	“particular	social	group”	is	ambigu-
























Next,	 the	 court	 cited	W-G-R-	 as	 representing	 how,	 “[r]egarding	 the	








































































This	background	provides	a	 compelling	way	 forward	 for	advo-




rence	 in	Pereira	 v.	 Sessions	 and	Kisor	 v.	Wilkie	 suggest	 that	 a	 court	
tasked	with	determining	whether	or	not	a	proposed	PSG	is	valid	must	
first	 identify	what	the	precise	question	at	 issue	is.	Then,	 it	must	ex-
haust	all	tools	of	statutory	construction	to	determine	whether	or	not	















BIA’s	 first	 or	 second	 round	 of	 additions	 to	 the	Acosta	definition.292	






analysis	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 is	 now	 likely	 to	 require	 after	 Kisor	 v.	
Wilkie.293	 In	Cece	 v.	Holder,	 the	 court	 did	not	 assume	 that	 the	 term	
“particular	social	group”	is	ambiguous	but	rather	undertook	its	own	
analysis	of	the	term	before	concluding	that	Congress	had	not	defined	
it.294	 It	 then	 reasoned	 that	 the	 BIA’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term	 in	

































to	demonstrate	 the	plurality’s	position	 that	 the	doctrine	has	not	al-
ways	been	applied	with	sufficient	rigor,	and	perhaps	even	too	reflex-
ively.300	Additionally,	the	Court’s	chidings	about	how	and	when	Auer	












standard	 by	 adopting	 the	 reasoning	 in	Cece	 v.	Holder,	which	 deter-






































in	 its	passage	of	 the	Refugee	Act	of	1980,	which	stated	 its	desire	to	
bring	domestic	asylum	law	into	conformance	with	international	obli-



















































and	 inconsistency	 of	 the	 PSG	 standard	 is	 resolved,	 asylum	 seekers	
with	valid	claims	will	continue	to	face	the	possibility	that	they	will	not	
be	granted	protection	from	persecution.	
	
 
	 306.	 Bednar,	supra	note	22,	at	357.	
